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Criminal Procedure-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT 
TO APPEAL A MIDTRIAL DISMISSAL-United States v. Scott, 98 S. 
Ct. 2187 (1978). 
John Scott was indicted for distributing narcotics. Prior to 
his trial before the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Michigan he moved to have the charge dismissed on 
grounds of preindictment delay.' He made the motion again dur- 
ing trial and at  the conclusion of the evidence the motion was 
granted. The government sought appellate review of the dismissal 
under 18 U.S.C. 8 37312 before the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit. That court held the government had no right to appeal 
as any further prosecution of Scott was barred by the double 
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.3 The Supreme Court 
r e ~ e r s e d , ~  holding that the double jeopardy clause is not offended 
by a government appeal when a defendant is successful in delib- 
erately seeking to terminate his trial before there is a finding by 
either judge or jury as to guilt or inn~cence.~  
In United States v. Sanges6 the Supreme Court considered 
for the first time the federal government's right to appeal adverse 
criminal decisions. The Court held that government had no right 
to appeal without express statutory authorization.' Since no ena- 
1. Scott was indicted on Mar. 5, 1975, for drug transactions which occurred on Sept. 
20, 1974, Sept. 24, 1974, and Jan. 22, 1975. Each transaction was the basis for a separate 
count in the indictment. The transactions allegedly violated 21 U.S.C. $841 (a)(l) (1970). 
Scott moved to have the first two counts dismissed because of preindictment delay. The 
jury acquitted the defendant on the third count. Brief for the United States a t  3-4, 6, 
United States v. Scott, 98 S. Ct. 2187 (1978). 
2. 18 U.S.C. 5 3731 (1970) states: 
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of 
appeals from a decision, judgment or order of a district court dismissing an 
indictment or information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal 
shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution 
prohibits further prosecution. 
. . . .  
The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its 
purpose. 
3. "[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
4. The government appealed the dismissal of the first two counts to the Sixth Circuit. 
Only the first count was appealed to the Supreme Court. United States v. Scott, 98 S. 
Ct. 2187, 2190 (1978). 
5. Id. a t  2199. 
6 .  144 U.S. 310 (1892). 
7. Id. a t  312. The Court indicated that the American common law, as developed by 
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bling statute existed, the Sanges Court did not reach questions 
involving the constitutional limits of government appeals in par- 
ticular cases? The constitutional question was finally reached in 
Kepner u. United States.' In that case, the Court decided that to 
allow the government to appeal from an acquittal would violate 
the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy? This 
rule was reinforced in Fong Foo u. United Statesll where the Court 
held that double jeopardy protection barred further proceedings 
even though an acquittal may have been "egregiously erro- 
neous. "I2 
A. Criminal Appeals Act 
In 1907, Congress enacted the Criminal Appeals Act13 which 
authorized government appeals in certain limited situations.I4 
The rules governing the conditions of appeal under the Act be- 
came "highly te~hnica l , "~~ and eventually the government's right 
to appeal came to depend primarily on the appellate court's de- 
termination that the lower court's disposition of the case fit into 
one of the statutorily defined categories. 
the state courts, prohibited the government from appealing after "a final judgment in 
favor of the defendant, whether that judgment had been rendered upon a verdict of 
acquittal, or upon a determination by the court of an issue of law." Id. at  318. 
8. See Comment, Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals in Criminal Cases, 12 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 295, 296 (1976). 
9. 195 U.S. 100 (1904). 
10. In Kepner, after the defendant was acquitted in the lower court the government 
had appealed and obtained a conviction in the Supreme Court of the Phillipines. The 
government's authority to appeal the lower court's ruling was derived from the military 
orders governing the administration of justice in the Phillipines at  that time. Id. at  110- 
16. 
11. 369 U.S. 141 (1962). 
12. The trial judge in Fong Foo had directed the jury to return verdicts of acquittal 
for all the defendants after listening to only four government witnesses. The Court of 
Appeals directed that the judgments of acquittal be set aside and the defendants tried 
again. The Supreme Court concluded that this was a violation of the defendants' rights 
under the double jeopardy clause. Id. a t  143. 
13. Criminal Appeals Act, ch. 2564'34 Stat. 1246 (1970) (current version a t  18 U.S.C. 
6 3731 (1970)). 
14. The Act permitted the federal government to appeal directly to the Supreme 
Court from orders setting aside an indictment or from decisions arresting judgment for 
insufficiency of an indictment when the basis of such rulings was the construction or 
invalidity of a criminal statute. It also permitted appeals to the Supreme Court from 
judgments sustaining pleas in bar prior to the attachment of jeopardy. Id. 
15. In United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975)' Justice Marshall stated that the 
Act "was construed in accordance with the common-law meaning of the terms employed, 
and the rules governing the conditions of appeal became highly technical." Id. a t  337. 
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B. The 1970 Amendments and the Wilson-Jenkins Rules 
In 1970, Congress amended the Criminal Appeals Act16 to 
eliminate "technical and outmoded distinctions in pleadings as 
limitations on appeals by the United States."17 Congress also in- 
tended to expand the government's right to appeal.18 The lan- 
guage originally -proposed for the amendment permitted the gov- 
ernment to appeal any dismissal of an indictment but provided 
"that no appeal shall lie from a judgment of acquittal."19 The fact 
that this language was later amended to disallow only those ap- 
peals prohibited by the double jeopardy clausez0 has been used by 
the Supreme Court in concluding that the legislative intent was 
to expand to the constitutional limits the government's right to 
appeal, leaving the determination of those boundaries to the 
I .  United States v. Wilson22 
United States v. Wilson was the first case to reach the Su- 
preme Court under the 1970 amendments. The trial judge had set 
aside the jury's guilty verdict by granting a postverdict motion 
to dismiss on grounds of preindictment delay." After deciding the 
purpose of the recent statutory amendments was to allow the 
government the right to appeal whenever the Constitution would 
permit, the Court concluded the basic protection afforded the 
criminal defendant by the fifth amendment's double jeopardy 
clause was a prohibition against multiple trials.z4 Since a success- 
ful government appeal would only require a reinstatement of the 
16. Omnibus Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-644, tit. III, 5 14(a), 84 Stat. 1890 
(1971) (amending 18 U.S.C. 5 3731 (1970)). 
17. S. REP. NO. 1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [I9701 U.S.  CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 2206, 2217. 
18. Id. a t  7. 
19. Id. at 1. 
20. Y.R. CONF. REP. NO. 1768, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1970). 
21. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1975). 
22. 420 U.S. 332 (1975). 
23. United States v. Wilson, 357 F. Supp. 619, 621 (E.D. Pa.), appeal denied, 492 
F.2d 1345 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 US.  332 (1975). 
24. 420 U.S. at 342-46. In his majority opinion, Justice Marshall traced the history 
of the double jeopardy principle back to three common law pleas: autrefois acquit, autre- 
fois convict, and pardon. By using one of these pleas, a defendant could avoid a second 
indictment if he could prove a prior acquittal or conviction for the same offense. Justice 
Marshall noted that the common law background of the double jeopardy clause does not 
suggest an implied prohibition against state appeals. "It was only when the defendant was 
indicted for the second time . . . that he could seek the protection of the common-law 
pleas." Id. a t  342. Justice Marshall concluded that the basic constitutional principle 
underlying the clause is its protection against multiple prosecutions. 
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jury's verdict and not a new trial, the Court reasoned that to allow 
an appeal would not violate the basic constitutional principle the 
double jeopardy clause was designed to protect.25 
The significance of the Wilson decision lies in its attempt to 
balance the basic interests of both the defendant and the govern- 
ment. The defendant has an interest in avoiding further proceed- 
ings once he has had a favorable disposition of his case. Another 
proceeding would only bring additional expense, harassment, and 
anxiety. The government, on the other hand, has an interest in 
convicting those guilty of violating its laws. Wilson holds that the 
double jeopardy clause protects the defendant's interest in avoid- 
ing a second trial,26 but when a successful government appeal 
would not result in a second trial the government's interest in 
justice outweighs "the defendant's interest in repose."27 
2. United States v. Jenkins28 
Jenkins was indicted for failing to report for induction into 
the armed services. The trial judge refused to retroactively apply 
an earlier Supreme Court ruling,2g and therefore dismissed the 
indictment and discharged the defendant.30 The Second Circuit 
dismissed an appeal by the government, holding that the dis- 
missal by the trial judge amounted to an acquittal which could 
not be appealed regardless of the need for a second trial in the 
event the ruling was reversed.31 
In affirming the decision of the Second C i r c ~ i t , : ~ ~  the Su- 
preme Court avoided the fine distinctions involved in labeling one 
termination an acquittal and another a dismissal. Instead, the 
Court based its decision on its reasoning in Wilson. Whereas in 
Wilson there were findings of guilt in the lower court which could 
be reinstated in the event of reversal, in Jenkins a successful 
government appeal would require "further proceedings of some 
sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the ele- 
25. See id. at 352-53. 
26. Id. at 342. 
27. Comment, Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals in Criminal Cases, 12 
COLUM. J L. & SOC. PROB. 295, 307 (1976). 
28. 420 U.S. 358 (1975). 
29. The Supreme Court ruling was in Ehlert v. United States, 420 U S .  99 (1971), 
where the Court ruled that local draft boards were not required to consider conscientious 
objector claims arising between notice of induction and the scheduled induction date. 
30. United States v. Jenkins, 349 F. Supp. 1068 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), appeal dismissed, 
490 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 358 (1975). 
31. United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 420 U S .  358 (1975). 
32. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U S .  358 (1975). 
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ments of the offense charged. "33 These "further proceedings," the 
Court reasoned, would violate the basic protection afforded by 
the double jeopardy clause.34 
Under the Wilson-Jenkins rules an appellate court was not 
required to search the trial record to see if there was an acquittal. 
The critical question was whether there had been any finding of 
guilt in the lower court which could be reinstated in the event of 
reversal. In Jenkins the Court indicated that the government 
could even appeal from a bench acquittal if it could be shown that 
the trial court found all the factual elements necessary for guilt, 
but acquitted the defendant on an erroneous legal theory.35 Since 
the judge's finding of guilt could be reinstated upon a successful 
government appeal, the appeal would be allowed.36 
Since Wilson and Jenkins, however, the Supreme Court has 
indicated a reluctance to apply these rules too mechanically. For 
example, in Lee v. United S t ~ t e s , ~ '  the Court treated a midtrial 
dismissal as a mistrial and thereby affirmed a conviction arising 
from the defendant's second Jenkins, which would have 
seemingly invalidated the second trial, was distinguished on the 
basis that the dismissal in Lee was granted by the trial judge in 
contemplation of a second prosecution. The Court indicated that 
whether the order is labeled a "dismissal" or a "declaration of 
mistrial" is not determinative, and that in Lee the order was 
"functionally indistinguishable from a declaration of mistrial. "39 
In the instant case the Supreme Court confronted the same 
issue it had faced in Jenkins: Whether the government should be 
allowed to appeal a dismissal entered by the trial judge after 
jeopardy has attached.40 Justice Rehnquist, in the majority opin- 
ion, admitted that "if Jenkins is a correct statement of the law, 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals relying on that decision . . . 
would in all likelihood have to be affirmed?' The Court, how- 
33. Id. at 370. 
34. Id. 
35. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c) states that in a bench trial, "the court shall make a general 
finding and shall in addition on request find the facts specially." 
36. 420 U.S. at 368. 
37. 432 U.S. 23 (1977). 
38. Id. at 34. In Lee the first information filed against the defendant was faulty 
because it made no mention of the requisite intent. 
39. Id. at 31. 
40. For a discussion of when jeopardy attaches, see note 62 infra. 
41. United States v. Scott, 98 S. Ct. 2187, 2191 (1978). 
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ever, was willing to expressly overrule Jenkins and allow the gov- 
ernment the right to appeal even though it was evident that 
"further proceedings" would be required if the government were 
successful. 
The Court indicated the Jenkins decision was based on what 
i t  perceived to be the underlying purpose of the double jeopardy 
clause. 
"The underlying idea . . . is that the State with all its resources 
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to 
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting 
him to embarassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him 
to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity . . . . "42 
The Court then observed that the instant case "is scarcely a 
picture of an all-powerful state relentlessly pursuing a defendant 
who had either been found not guilty or who had a t  least insisted 
on having the issue of guilt submitted to the first trier of 
Where, as here, the defendant seeks to terminate the trial, the 
double jeopardy clause "does not relieve a defendant from the 
consequences of his voluntary choice."44 
The four dissenting Justices argued that "[tlhe Court's at- 
tempt to draw a distinction between 'true acquittals' and other 
final judgments favorable to the accused quite simply is unsup- 
portable in either logic or They contended that by al- 
lowing an appeal from a ruling which could only be made after 
factual development at trial, the majority was in fact allowing an 
appeal from an a~quit tal .~ '  
III. ANALYSIS 
The Wilson-Jenkins rules have been applauded by some 
commentators as being the basis upon which future decisions 
could rely, thus bringing uniformity and consistency to an area 
of the law previously plagued with disparity." By overruling 
Jenkins, however, the Supreme Court has indicated its dissatis- 
faction with rigid, mechanical rules in the area of government 
42. Id. a t  2196 (quoting United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975) (quoting 
United States v. Green, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957))). 
43. Id. a t  2196. 
44. Id. at 2198. 
45. Id. a t  2200 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
46. Id. a t  2204-05 (Brennan, J ., dissenting). 
47. See Comment, Double Jeopardy and Governm.ent Appeals in Criminal Cases, 12 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 295,350 (1976); Note, Twice in Jeopardy; Prosecutorial Appeals 
of Sentences, 63 VA.  L. REV. 325, 342-47 (1977). 
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criminal appeals. The Court's decision in Scott reflects its frus- 
tration with a legal system that allows a single trial judge to 
terminate a proceeding in favor of a criminally culpable defen- 
dant on legal grounds and then disallows review of that legal 
decision. This Case Note will examine the Court's reasons for 
rejecting the Jenkins rule and will suggest an alternative ap- 
proach for double jeopardy analysis. 
A. Examination of the Court's Reasoning 
1. Balancing Test Approach 
In Wilson, the Court recognized that the basic protection 
afforded the criminal defendant by the double jeopardy clause is 
i t s  prohibition against multiple trials." Although Justice 
Rehnquist cited this "multiple prosecution" rationale with ap- 
proval in the present case, he did not rely on it in ultimately 
reaching a decision." Instead, he chose language indicating a 
broader coverage for the clause's basic protection. Justice 
Rehnquist concluded that the double jeopardy clause was de- 
signed to "guard against government oppressi~n."~~) His primary 
focus was on the harassment that may result from multiple prose- 
cutions, not the prosecutions them~elves.~' 
By this analysis, multiple trials would be barred only to the 
extent that they are oppressive. While the defendant would not 
be protected from the threat of a second proceeding, he would be 
protected from the harassment of multiple prosecutions. This 
declaration of the underlying function of the double jeopardy 
clause is consistent with the Court's willingness to allow the de- 
fendant to be prosecuted again for the same offense in the event 
of a mistrial.52 I t  is also consistent with allowing a defendant to 
be reprosecuted if his conviction is reversed on appeal." It is 
questionable whether reprosecution in one of these latter instan- 
ces subjects the defendant to any less harassment than in the 
instant case." By identifying the basic policy considerations in- 
-- p- 
48. 420 U.S. at 343. 
49. 98 S. Ct. at 2191, 2193, 2197-98. 
50. Id. at 2198. 
51. See id. This idea has been expressed in the legal maxim, "no one shall be twice 
vexed for the same cause." (Nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.) State v. Lee, 65 
Conn. 265, 272, 30 A. 1110, 1111 (1894). 
52. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977). 
53. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 
662 (1896). 
54. Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 12, 15 (1960). 
7421 CASE NOTES 749 
volved in double jeopardy cases, i.e., the defendant's interest in 
avoiding the harassment of multiple prosecutions and the govern- 
ment's interest in convicting those guilty of violating the law, the 
Scott Court was able to balance the respective interests and reach 
a conclusion consistent with prior decisions. 
2. Requirement of No Acquittal 
Although the Court balanced the conflicting interests in 
reaching the end result, it qualified its holding by adhering to the 
traditional requirement of determining whether there was an ac- 
quittal. The Court emphasized that since there was no submis- 
sion of the defendant's guilt or innocence to the judge or jury, 
there was no "resolution . . . of some or all of the factual ele- 
ments of the offense charged"" which would constitute an acquit- 
tal. It is apparent therefore, that one task facing appellate courts 
in future cases will be to make a similar determination since a 
factual resolution favorable to the defendant would constitute an  
acquittal from which no appeal lies. 
B~ requiring appellate courts to search for an acquittal, the 
Supreme Court has greatly complicated government appeals 
from midtrial dismissals. It was the necessity of this kind of inves- 
tigation that agonized courts prior to Wilson and Jenkins." The 
"process of searching the record for an acquittal was time con- 
suming and unpredictable," resulting in disparate and inconsist- 
ent re~ults .~ '  Since many dismissals are based on decisions involv- 
ing mixtures of law and fact, separation of these elements will 
produce arbitrary distinctions. 
An example of just such a seemingly arbitrary distinction is 
presented by the majority in the instant case. The Court argued 
that the dismissal of an indictment on grounds of preindictment 
delay represented a legal judgment "that a defendant although 
criminally culpable may not be punished because of a supposed 
constitutional v iola t i~n."~~ The Court contrasted this type of rul- 
ing with an acquittal based on a finding that the defendant was 
insane or entrapped. These latter rulings were characterized as 
essentially factual determinations establishing the defendant's 
lack of criminal culpability, therefore constituting unappealable 
- 
55. 98 S.  Ct. at 2196-97 (quoting United States v.  Martin Linen, 430 U S .  564, 571 
(1977)). 
56. Comment, Double Jeopardy and Gouernm.ent Appeals in Criminal Cases, 12 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 295, 310 (1976). 
57. Id. 
58. 98 S. Ct. at 2197. 
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acquittals." The Court admitted that although the acquittal in 
the latter instances "may result from erroneous evidentiary rul- 
ings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles,""" 
it would be willing to allow the criminally culpable defendant to 
go free in spite of the legal error? 
By drawing this distinction, the Court detracts from the full 
application of the balancing test used to achieve the result in the 
instant case. To allow government appeals from acquittals based 
on erroneous legal findings of entrapment or insanity can hardly 
be said to be any more oppressive than to allow government ap- 
peals from dismissals based on erroneous legal findings of prein- 
dictment delay. The government's interest in convicting the 
guilty and in maintaining public respect for the criminal justice 
system is implicated in both cases, while in either case the defen- 
dant is subjected to virtually the same kind of harassment, ex- 
pense, and anxiety. 
This inconsistency arises out of the Court's continued adher- 
ence to traditional notions of when jeopardy attaches and when 
i t  terminates.(j2 The traditional jeopardy framework used to bal- 
ance the respective interests of government and defendant is so 
inflexible that even when these interests are considered in light 
of the broader purpose of the double jeopardy clause the results 
can still be irrational. 
B. An Alternate Approach 
In Kepner v. United States,(j3 Justice Holmes filed a strong 
dissent stating "that logically and rationally a man cannot be 
said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however 
often he may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy 
from its beginning to the end of the cause."64 This idea of continu- 
ing jeopardy has never been approved by a majority of the Su- 
preme Court. In fact, the Court recently rejected the idea, believ- 
ing that the underlying policies of the double jeopardy clause 
-- 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. For example, in Crist v. Bretz, 91 S. Ct. 2156 (1978), the Court held that the 
federal rule that jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is empaneled and sworn 
is a fundamental part of the double jeopardy protection and is therefore applicable to the 
states. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-95 (1969). In a bench trial, jeopardy 
attaches when the judge begins to hear the evidence. E.g., McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 
640 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 610 (1936). 
63. 195 U.S. 100 (1904). 
64. Id. at 134 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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would not permit "the Government to appeal after a verdict of 
acquittal. "G 
The theoretical framework provided by the notion of continu- 
ing jeopardy, however, is far more consistent with the Court's 
decision in Scot t  than is the traditional notion of jeopardy; i .e.,  
that the defendant is taken out of jeopardy at  the termination of 
the first proceeding. If the evil the clause is designed to prevent 
is undue harassment of a defendant through multiple prosecu- 
tions for the same offense, then jeopardy can be properly 
"thought of as continuing until the final settlement of any one 
prosec~tion."~~ If this approach were adopted, the appellate court 
would not need to search the trial record in order to determine if 
a dismissal might actually be an  acquittal. The government 
would be allowed to appeal any dismissal or acquittal since the 
appellate process would be viewed as a continuation of the jeop- 
ardy attached to the first proceeding." 
Even some who oppose this notion admit that expanded ap- 
pellate review under such a theory would "avoid the release of 
some defendants who have benefited from instructions or eviden- 
tiary rulings that are unduly favorable to them."" A system of 
criminal procedure which holds a verdict of acquittal to be final, 
yet allows review of a conviction, tips the scales of justice decid- 
edly in the defendant's favor. The trial judge knows that if he 
rules for the defendant on doubtful points and gives the jury 
instructions offered by him, he will diminish the possibility of 
being reversed on appeal? This edge enhances the defendant's 
likelihood of an acquittal. If the government were allowed to ap- 
peal, the judge would be less able to hide his mistakes in acquit- 
tals, and the government's interest in convicting the guilty would 
be served without subjecting the defendant to undue harassment. 
Expanded appellate review would also promote the uniform de- 
velopment of criminal law and procedure. In view of the incon- 
sistent results likely to result from the Scot t  decision, this would 
be a distinct advantage. 
Commentators have noted that if the notion of continuing 
jeopardy were adopted, the government would then be permitted 
to appeal a jury acquittal.'O Since the Supreme Court has de- 
65. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975). 
66. Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1960). 
67. Id. 
68. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975). 
69. Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486, 511 (1927). 
70. See Comment, Double Jeopardy Limitations on Appeals by the Government in 
Criminal Cases, 80 DICK. L. REV. 525, 534 (1976). 
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clared that the defendant has a valuable interest in the first jury 
empaneled to try him," i t  is argued that appellate review of a jury 
acquittal would deprive the defendant of that interest.'* In Scott, 
however, Justice Rehnquist stated that  the Jenkins decision 
"placed an unwarrantedly great emphasis on the defendant's 
right to have his guilt decided by the first jury empaneled to try 
him."7This language indicates an unwillingness by the Court to 
give greater weight to the defendant's interest in his first jury 
than to the government's interest in convicting the guilty. The 
continuing jeopardy concept does not ignore the defendant's in- 
terest; it rather serves to assure that government interests are at  
least given equal consideration in the balancing test. 
Opponents of the continuing jeopardy notion also contend 
the power of juries would be seriously eroded by adoption of the 
concept because "[alppellate review would usurp the factfin- 
der's assessment of the credibility and weight of the e~idence."'~ 
Other commentators argue that by allowing appeals from jury 
acquittals the traditional freedom of juries to "acquit when facts 
and law dictate otherwise" would be curtailed.'" 
While it is true the right to a jury trial is fundamental to our 
system of criminal justice, the idea that a jury decision in a crimi- 
nal action should never be reviewed carries the right too far. In 
civil cases, jury verdicts are subject to attack on appeal and can 
be overturned only by a showing that the evidence failed to sus- 
tain the verdi~t . '~ In criminal cases the standard would be even 
higher since the prosecution has the burden of proving guilt be- 
yond a reasonable doubt. If a jury said it was not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt, "it would indeed be an omniscient 
court which could say that the jury was so convinced."'' Also the 
scope of appellate review would be limited to errors appearing on 
the record. If the record showed an errorless proceeding and a jury 
verdict of not guilty, the judgment could not be reversed by the 
appellate court.7R The defendant's right to a jury trial can be 
71. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973). 
72. Comment, Double Jeopardy Limitations on Appeals by the Government in Crim- 
inal Cases, 80 DICK. L. REV. 525, 536 n.81 (1976). 
73. 98 S. Ct. at 2191. 
74. Comment, Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals of  Criminal Dismissals, 52 
TEX. L. REV. 303, 340 (1974). 
75. Comment, Double Jeopardy Limitations on Appeals by the Government in Crim- 
inal Cases, 80 DICK. L. REV. 525, 536 (1976). 
76. See, e . g ,  McIntyre v. Belt Ry., 105 Ill. App. 2d 45, 245 N.E.2d 94 (1969); 5 AM. 
JUR. 2d Appeal and Error O 834 (1962). 
77. Miller, Appeals by the State in Crim,inal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486, 499 (1927). 
78. Id. 
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preserved even if the government is allowed to appeal. 
Although the Supreme Court has never adopted the continu- 
ing jeopardy notion, Justice Holmes has not been the only propo- 
nent of the idea. Prior to Benton v. Mary l~nd , '~  which made the 
double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the four- 
teenth amendment, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors 
used the concept of continuing jeopardy to allow the state to 
appeal a jury acquittal in State v. Lee.R0 The state jurisdictional 
statute, which gave the state and defendant equal rights of ap- 
peal, was held to be constitutional by the Supreme Court in Palko 
v. Connecticut." In Palko, the Court chose to predicate its deci- 
sion on the fourteenth amendment, thereby avoiding the fifth 
amendment issue.82 Although decided on the fourteenth amend- 
ment, Justice Cardozo indicated his sympathy for Justice 
Holmes' dissent in Kepner? The sentiments expressed by the 
Palko Court in favor of the continuing jeopardy notion have 
caused some speculation on what the result would have been had 
that Court been confronted with the Kepner problem.n4 
In the instant case, Justice Rehnquist admitted that "Mr. 
Justice Holmes' concept of continuing jeopardy would have 
greatly simplified the matter of Government appea l~ . "~We chose 
not to use the concept in his opinion because "it has never been 
accepted by a majority of this Court."s6 
79. 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
80. 65 Conn. 265, 30 A. 1110 (1894). 
81. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). This decision was overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 
784 (1969). 
82. 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Note, Appeals by the State in Criminal Proceedings, 47 YALE 
L.J. 489, 492 (1938). 
83. Justice Cardozo stated: 
[Tlhe dissenting opinions show how much was to be said in favor of a different 
ruling. Right-minded men . . . could reasonably, even if mistakenly, believe 
that a second trial was lawful in prosecutions subject to the Fifth Amendment, 
if it was all in the same case. Even more plainly, right-minded men could 
reasonably believe that in espousing that conclusion they were not favoring a 
practice repugnant to the conscience of mankind. 
. . . .  
The state is not attempting to wear the accused out by a multitude of cases 
with accumulated trials. It  asks no more than this, that the case against him 
shall go on until there be a trial free from the corrosion of substantial legal error. 
This is not cruelty at  all, nor even vexation in any immoderate degree . . . . 
The edifice of justice stands, its symmetry, to many greater than before. 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323, 328 (1937) (citations omitted). 
84. Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 
HAW. L. REV. 1, 12 (1960). 
85. 98 S. Ct. a t  2193 n.6. 
86. Id. 
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Since handing down Scot t ,  the Supreme Court has held that 
a Maryland juvenile rule, which allows the state to file exceptions 
to a master's proposals, is not a violation of the juvenile's rights 
under the double jeopardy clause.x7 Although the Court conceded 
that jeopardy attached in the master's hearing, i t  was willing to 
treat review of the master's proposals by the juvenile court as part 
of the original jeopardy because the juvenile judge was the ulti- 
mate fact finder and adjudicator under the statutory scheme.xx 
The dissent argued that the statutory scheme is only a "novel 
redefinition of trial and appellate functions . . . , intentionally 
designed to avoid the constraints of the Double Jeopardy 
C l a u ~ e . " ~ ~  Therefore, the dissent reasoned, the decision "bears an 
uncomfortable resemblance" to Justice Holmes' notion of con- 
tinuing jeopardy? 
The Maryland case is interesting because the Court, as in 
Scot t ,  used a balancing test approach on the double jeopardy 
question." The Court was able to do this only because the statute 
allowed it to regard the review by the judge as part of a single 
proceeding. Thus, the continuing jeopardy idea was used without 
being labeled as such. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A legal system which "place[s] in the hands of a single 
judge the great and dangerous power of finally acquitting the 
most notorious  criminal^"^^ is fatally flawed. In Scot t ,  the Su- 
preme Court indicated its frustration with allowing criminally 
culpable defendants to go free because of a possibly erroneous 
legal judgment.93 The Court based its decision in Scot t  on the 
underlying policies of the double jeopardy clause and balanced 
the respective interests of defendant and government in reaching 
a result. However, the Court indicated an unwillingness to apply 
this balancing test approach in future cases involving similar 
policy  consideration^.^^ The Court was forced into this retreat 
because it was locked in by traditional notions of when jeopardy 
attaches and terminates. If the Supreme Court were to adopt the 
Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699, 2706-07 (1978). 
Id. a t  2704 n.9, 2706 n.12. 
Id. at  2710 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
Id. at  2712. 
See id. at  2707. 
United States v. Kepner, 195 U.S. 100, 137 (1903) (Brown, J., dissenting). 
98 S. Ct. a t  2196. 
Id. a t  2197. 
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continuing jeopardy notion, it would then be able to apply its 
interest-balancing test without restraint. 
Gary E. J u b  ber 
